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 ONLY APORIAS TO OFFER? ETIENNE BALIBAR’S POLITICS AND THE 
AMBIGUITY OF WAR 
 
Claudia Aradau 
 
 
Etienne Balibar’s intellectual trajectory can be described as a series of post-
Marxist and anti-fascist interventions in a conjuncture defined by tensions and conflicts 
over the fate of historical materialism, class struggle, and leftist politics more generally.1 
Faithful to an understanding of philosophy which resonates with Althusserian echoes, his 
interventions attempt to untie and retie the knot between conjuncture and writing, to untie 
the elements of the conjuncture from within the element of writing and retie the 
conditions of writing under the constraint of the conjuncture.2 The interview with Etienne 
Balibar and Sandra Mezzadra published by New Formations engages in this double move 
of untying the conjuncture from within philosophy and retying philosophy under the 
imperatives of the conjuncture. The conjuncture addressed both in the interview and in 
the recent English translations of Balibar’s work is that of global war, the crisis of the 
national social state, the fortification of borders, racism and ‘apartheid’.3 Philosophically, 
the elements of Balibar’s writing are under the influence of Marx, Spinoza, Althusser, 
Foucault or Arendt. Best known to the English audience through the his ‘fidelity’ to 
Althusser, Balibar’s recent writings on politics engage with the work Jacques Rancière, 
another of Althusser’s students and contributors to Reading Capital.4   
Unlike Althusser however, Etienne Balibar unties the conjuncture in a singular 
way. His is not an analysis of how power functions, not a synthesis of contradictions or 
an exploration of a politics of resistance. Balibar’s recent work reveals political 
possibilities in what he sees as the aporetic constitution of the present conjuncture.  To 
face up to the difficulties of the conjuncture, the proper philosophical position is to 
elucidate its uncertainties, enigmas and aporias and orient thinking towards the conditions 
of possibility of the future.5 His interventions are meant to shed light on the ‘paradoxes of 
actuality’ as he said in relation to the European constitution. Contrary to Derrida, 
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Balibar’s aporias are not interminable resistances or remainders implied by the very 
experience of the impossible.6 Aporias are defined between necessity and impossibility, 
as the aporia of Europe which is straddled between the necessity of inventing new names 
for politics, new images of the people for a new Europe and the impossibility of re-
formulating the relation between ethnos (membership in a political community) and 
demos (the continued creation of citizenship through collective struggles).7  
As our task is to untie and expose the elements of the conjuncture in their 
blockages and limitations, Balibar can reverse Marx’s famous formula: we have enough 
transformed the world, now it is time to interpret it.8 It is not a break-up with Marxism 
that Balibar has in mind here, but a new mode of engaging with the real. Thus, an 
analysis of the European ‘apartheid’ through the tensions entailed by the absolutisation of 
national values, discourses of colonialism and the construction of a European identity 
leads to the reformulation of an anti-racist politics, a politics of active citizenship and 
‘residency citizenship, i.e. political equality among residents in the generalized public 
space of “post-national” Europe (3).9 The aporia of borders as the ‘non-democratic 
conditions of democracy’ can be open to democratisation, their discretionary character 
placed under collective control of the people. The conditions of global war can be 
modified by a ‘vanishing mediator’, a Europe which can perform the function of 
translation between the cultures and languages of the world, on condition of withdrawing 
or disappearing in its own intervention.10  
In the interview, both Balibar and Mezzadra locate the condition of war at the 
heart of the analysis of the present. Balibar’s engagement with the concept of war is an 
engagement with a politics for the present, as war is both a condition of the real and a 
condition of politics. In the line of Hardt and Negri’s global state of war, Sandro 
Mezzadra speaks about the ubiquity of war, its increasing role in shaping social relations 
within unified political spaces combined with a form of ‘traditional war that develops 
independently of the regulations set up by international law (11).11 Balibar would also 
speak of the ‘militarisation of society’ and elsewhere of the ‘militarisation of politics’. In 
the wake of 9/11, war has become the definitory condition of our conjuncture and we are 
‘more and more living and thinking and acting, or reacting, under a sort of dominant 
pressure which comes from the vicinity of war’ (11). The globalisation of real war, its 
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effects upon society raise the very pertinent problematique of the form of leftist politics 
possible under conditions of war. For both Marx and Foucault, the model of war was the 
imaginary horizon of politics. Yet, politics as war has also found a conservative 
revolutionary formulation in the work of Carl Schmitt. The interview points to the 
paradox of politics as war: politics proper must avoid war as its horizon, while remaining 
conflictual, a politics of disagreement against the other form of depoliticisation, liberal 
consensus. Although the interview broaches these questions of the ambiguity of war and 
the relation of war to politics, it does not discuss Balibar’s concept of politics understood 
as egaliberté (equaliberty) and civility. His concept of politics remains however a form of 
conflictual politics that avoids both the dangers of war and the dangers of consensus (14). 
It is not simply a theoretical interest that underpins the importance of the politics of 
equaliberty and civility, but the fact that it is a politics to be practiced under the 
conditions of a global war sustained by an economic and security consensus. 
 
Politics as war 
 
For both Carl Schmitt and Michel Foucault, war was part of an anti-liberal critical 
move.12 War can be seen as defining both the politics of the state and revolutionary or 
insurrectional politics. Foucault’s recasting of politics as war was fundamental to the 
exposure of the disciplinary and biopolitical technologies that have taken hold of life 
rather than benign fostering of life as the ultimate value of peaceful governmentality. The 
warlike practices of power expose the struggles against power and challenge the 
legitimation of certain forms of violence by the state.13 The analyser of war redefines the 
functioning of power in liberal societies. It has lead to criticism against Foucault’s 
supposed equation of fascist and liberal regimes. The critical import of war as an analyser 
is not however to show the continuity between forms of power – which would go against 
the grain of Foucault’s analyses of discontinuities – but to expose the functioning of the 
supposedly peaceful liberal order.  The conceptualisation of politics as war can be seen as 
the counterpart to the liberal ban of war outside the realm of politics. Since Hobbes, war 
has been banned to the international ‘state of nature’ where states can behave as free 
individuals. Peace, security and order can only be achieved through a process of 
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permanent ordering, regulation and normalisation of the subject. Civil peace requires not 
only a sovereign, but also a population trained and educated in the civic virtues of justice, 
gratitude and complaisance14. The Hobbesian commonwealth is ordered through 
disciplinary strategies that make citizens docile and abiding by the laws of civil society.  
If Foucault’s ‘politics as war’ exposes the practices of pacified liberal states, 
Schmitt’s concept of war is the permanent horizon of politics. ‘War as the most extreme 
political means’, Schmitt argues, ‘discloses the possibility that underlies every political 
idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy’.15 War is however more than the 
extreme possibility of the political tension. It functions as a fictional hypothesis that 
makes the ordering of liberal spaces possible. As Balibar has pointed out, the necessity of 
the state in Hobbes can only be accountable in terms of ‘a permanent state of exception, a 
limit-experience rooted in the possibility of reversal of civil peace into violence and civil 
war’.16 War and violence are not simply the premises of the hypothetical state of nature, 
but enable the peaceful condition of the commonwealth through the permanent spectre of 
the exception. 
A Foucauldian reading of Schmitt would see the exception, the possibility of war, 
as a fictional strategy that allows for the deployment of disciplinary and biopolitical 
technologies of power to order and regulate the population. ‘Politics as war’ negates the 
liberal relegation of war outside politics at the expense of a ‘preventive counter-violence’ 
against social struggles. 17 It also negates the supposedly peaceful liberal politics of 
negotiation and discussion with a view to achieving consensus, as it shows civil peace 
underpinned by warring forms of power.  The state organises another form of violence, 
the violence necessary to maintain or re-establish an order threatened by destruction or 
subversion. The entire organisation of the state can therefore be understood ‘as a system 
of preventive defence against the mass movements that form the basis of civil wars (of 
classes and of religions) and of revolutions’.18  
Schmitt’s concept of war as the horizon of politics has opposite effects to 
Foucault’s war as an analyser of power relations. While Foucault attempts to uncover 
resistance and struggles which have been silenced by the pacified liberal order, Schmitt 
disavows such struggles in the name of a politics that creates the political community as a 
homogeneous entity to confront the enemy. The ‘ubiquity of war’ (11) and the more 
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general trench war that the ‘war on terrorism’ has opened against migrants can be 
understood as a Foucauldian reading of Schmitt. 19  The continuity of war in social and 
political life explored by Foucault does not have much purchase for a liberalism which 
has shed its ‘pacified’ technologies of power and has engaged into an indefinite war on 
terror. War is no longer the disavowed possibility of politics, but politics has become was 
in the most extreme sense envisaged by Schmitt. Politics is not warlike, but is war.  
 
Politics as liberal consensus 
 
The politics of consensus is liberalism’s own answer to the dangers of war. Yet, Schmitt 
has shown consensual politics as cognate to politics as war through its disavowed 
condition of possibility. The politics of liberal consensus is on the one hand a politics of 
representation of interests and negotiation and on the other a politics of ‘realism’, of 
solving social problems by having recourse to the objectivity of expertise. As a politics of 
negotiation, liberal consensus excludes the enemies of liberalism. As a politics of 
management, it subsumed to the necessity of economy or the necessity of security. 
A politics of negotiation and consensus depends on the exclusion of the enemies 
of liberalism. Thus politics as war, the distinction between friends and enemies is the 
condition of possibility of liberalism. Schmitt’s distinction between hostis and inimicus 
(enemy and foe), between properly political enemies and foes to be eliminated points to a 
paradox at the heart of liberalism.20 A politics of negotiation or a liberal space of civil 
peace can only be achieved through the elimination of the foes of liberalism. The foes are 
the unjust enemies, bandits, pirates and revolutionaries. For both Schmitt and the liberals, 
those are anathema to the unfolding of a politics defined by negotiation and consensus-
forming strategies. The common enemy of both Schmitt and liberalism is the one which 
threatens civil peace and maintenance of stability. Where Schmitt and the liberals part 
ways is exactly in the way they close down politics, by excluding those who threaten the 
order of the state and creating political enemies or adversaries. Schmitt effects this 
closure of politics through the idea of the homogeneous community, whose substance can 
vary historically from the nation-form to that of the German Volk, but whose 
homogeneity gives content to the state.21  Liberalism reformulates politics as a 
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competition between acknowledged agents and closes down politics by strategies of 
recognising adversaries.   
Recent leftist attempts to criticise the disavowed violence of liberalism, while 
keeping conflict as the model of politics reproduce the exclusion of enemies that Schmitt 
has enacted. Agonism, as put forward by Chantal Mouffe or William Connolly, combines 
continual tension with respect for the adversary in a mode of ‘restrained contestation 
among friends, lovers and adversaries who exercise reciprocal respect and self-limitation 
through mutual appreciation of the problematical bases from which they proceed’.22 Yet, 
this is the very model of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, of the rationalisation and 
humanisation of war among sovereign states in Europe at the expense of more violent 
wars elsewhere. The bracketing of war is only possible due to the discovery of the New 
World as a ‘free space’ where the darker conflicts can be fought out with impunity. 
Agonism has therefore already necessarily excluded or displaced those who would not be 
restrained, the foes or antagonistic enemies. Agonism, just like consensual liberalism, 
excludes the enemies of radical democracy. It de-differentiates social struggles, including 
them in a pluralism of identities that could accommodate difference in a lower intensity 
of contestation and excludes social struggles that claim the restructuring of society and of 
the political space of radical democracy. Consensual politics excludes excessive or 
surplus interlocutors23, as it presupposes the already given identities of the interlocutors, 
their existence as parties in an a priori defined political space.  
Consensual politics allows us to understand the resurgence of racism in liberal 
societies. Racism is not the negation of liberalism, but its very condition as the 
‘constitution of each individual as a threat to community [becomes] the strict correlate of 
the consensual requirement of a community wholly realised’.24  Migrants become the 
radical other, those who are to be excluded from the already defined political community. 
Post-9/11 there has been a transformation in what Jacques Rancière has identified as the 
two regimes of consensual politics, economy and security.25 Although the transformation 
has been underway for longer, the indefinite war on terror has projected it globally. The 
transformation is that from a consensual politics defined under the necessity of economic 
requirements and the necessity to respond to increasing insecurity. The managerial, 
expert politics that has mobilised knowledge to find answers to social problems tries now 
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to manage security problems. Both security and economy function as forms of 
depoliticisation of political action under the imperative of necessity. The global war 
privileges this matrix of consensual politics, a matrix focused on preventing or 
eliminating insecurity. Rather than a community of interest, it creates a community of 
fear closed upon itself. Fear against the threatening other, the one who has no place in the 
already defined empirical community transposes borders from the edge of the territory to 
the centre of the political space. It is not only external borders that keep migrants in a 
permanent situation of insecurity, but internal borders, the anthropological and 
institutional borders that turn second-generation migrants from lawful citizens into 
unwelcome, unintegrated and hence dangerous foreigners. Balibar is right to argue that 
there is no hegemonic alternative nowadays to the necessity of the market and the 
necessity of security (11). As the market has no outside and global capitalism has 
encompassed the world, spaces for alternative practices become virtually non-existent.  
 
Politics as equaliberty and civility 
 
The blockages of the conjuncture and the folding of politics onto the twin poles of war 
and consensus can however be open to another analysis. Contra the liberal tradition that 
privileges either equality or liberty, Balibar retrieves another tradition of thought going 
back to the French revolution. The Declaration of rights that founded the French modern 
nation-state and the institution of citizenship are based on the ‘proposition of 
equaliberty’, which considers all individuals of equal value and is open onto the idea that, 
at least potentially, all human beings are citizens. Equality and liberty are therefore 
inseparable, based on the historical discovery that ‘their extensions are necessarily 
identical’ or, in a more simple formulation, that  the situations in which both are either 
present or absent are necessarily the same.26 In practice, ‘neither can true liberty go 
without equality nor can true equality go without liberty’. As the equation of liberty and 
equality has emerged out of historical practice, there is no proof of this truth but a 
negative one: equality and liberty are always contradicted together. Equality and liberty 
are contradicted in the same situations, there can be no situations which suppress or 
repress freedom and do not also suppress or diminish equality. The opposite of the 
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proposition of equaliberty is also true: situations of constraints on freedom also mean 
social inequality. Unfreedom is therefore identical to inequality as freedom is identical to 
equality.  
 If Schmitt closed politics upon the substantial equality of a homogeneous 
community and consensual liberalism closed it upon the formal equality in front of the 
market, Balibar’s equality represents a universal right that a form of inequality, 
domination or discrimination has denied.27  As the right to vote for example had been 
equated at some point with the concrete universal of man to the exclusion of women, 
women have claimed for the universality of citizenship. The equality of a universal right 
is simultaneously the freedom to act, to resist against forms of domination. The politics of 
equaliberty means that rights are always gained in struggles which make visible a 
structural division of the community between those who are legitimate political subjects 
and the ‘part of no part’. A politics of equaliberty introduces surplus interlocutors and 
conflict within consensual politics. Conflict is however not formalised war where the 
‘content’ is irrelevant, but is informed by the unconditional principle of equaliberty.  
The politics of equaliberty needs its own conditions of possibility, the universal 
principles of the community that can be challenged by those who have no part in politics. 
Yet, in the current global conjuncture, claims to equal liberty are impossible from the 
standpoint of the surplus or disposable people, of those whom capitalism neutralises 
rather than include in productive processes. New forms of trafficking in human beings or 
organs render impossible any claim to the right to politics through the practical 
impossibility for victims ‘to present themselves in person as political subjects, capable of 
emancipating humanity by emancipating themselves’.28 This impossibility of political 
action has confronted us in the recent French riots. Victims of forms of state violence, the 
young men of the banlieues could not present themselves as political subjects, capable of 
emancipation. The French riots have been the revealing moment of a political 
impossibility, of the impossible redefinition of the relation that the inhabitants of the 
banlieues have with ‘their’ state.  
Although the riots have made visible the problem of violent stigmatisation 
through continuous and arbitrary police control as well as of race and class 
discrimination29, the rioters have not formulated any direct political claim despite a 
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powerful malcontent. Moreover, the riots have been a form of (self-)destructive violence, 
as the burned cars were the hard acquired possessions of the people in the banlieues. One 
could say that these forms of self-destructive violence are indicative of the impossibility 
of symbolising conflicts, of the impossibility of politics proper. While a situation of 
domination and discrimination has been made visible, what is lacking is exactly the 
universal with which the young people of the banlieues could identify and which could 
redefine their relation to the French state. If the French riots have made visible a political 
problem, they have not opened the space of symbolisation of conflicts. This space is non-
existent and needs to be discovered. 
Balibar’s concept of politics as civility refers exactly to the necessity of a space 
where conflicts can be symbolised and the universal of equality formulated. Civility is 
not synonymous to tolerance; it is a mode of relating to ourselves and of imagining 
possibilities of identification and dis-identification that would not take us to the extremes 
of violence. Creating spaces of civility concerns both ‘the field of institutional creation, 
with its collective, practical dimension and its legal, symbolical one’.30 If a politics of 
equal liberty can challenge the police state and the forms of discriminatory violence it 
perpetrates, a politics of civility needs to invent the fictions that define the relation 
between the state and its people. When this relation becomes mediated only by the police, 
immigration or unemployment bureaus, the state no longer appears as ‘their’ state 
although the young men of the banlieues belong to the people of the same country. The 
French riots have shown the lack of such a fiction or the lack of spaces within which 
these fictions could be constituted. Without the fictions that create the conditions for the 
symbolisation of conflicts, a politics of equaliberty cannot be articulated and the politics 
of war turns inwards in a revealing moment of self-destruction as the impossibility of 
becoming a political subject. 
 The French riots speak to the concern that Balibar has expressed about the 
possibility of political action (15). The interview has placed the question of political 
action in direct relation to the conditions of real global war and warlike practices on the 
one hand and the model of politics on the other. ‘Politics as war’ can no longer illuminate 
practices of power disavowed by an apparently pacified liberal order. It also cannot be a 
war that formalises the relation between friends and enemies, as such formalisation is 
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always already depoliticising. Yet, it must remain conflictual against the consensus of the 
market and of security. What politics could be practicable under the conditions of the 
present is an implicit thread throughout the interview and the analysis of the conjuncture. 
Active citizenship, the liberation of borders and labour, residency citizenship are forms of 
a politics of equaliberty. Although politics remains conflictual, conflict is subsumed to 
universal principles and ‘conditioned’ by an injunction of civility that distinguishes its 
process from the forms of global war. The constitution of spaces of civility and the 
relation to institutions remain however challenges for the ‘art of the politics’. In the 
interview, Balibar links political action with institutional forms, rules and codes. As the 
new institutions of the global order are premised on security and the market and 
reproduce the forms of global war, I wonder whether Balibar does not place his concept 
of politics in an impasse. If a politics of equaliberty can reclaim universal principles 
inscribed in institutions, a politics of civility needs to open a space for politics at a 
distance from institutions, creating solidarities and forms of organisation that can move 
the limits of collective power.  
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